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Abstract
The available empirical evidence suggests that non-negligible differences in economic
structures persist among euro area countries. Because of these asymmetries, an area-wide
modelling approach is arguably less reliable, from a strictly statistical viewpoint, than a multi-
country one. This paper revolves around thefollowing issue: arethose(statistically detectable)
asymmetries of any practical relevance when it comes to supporting monetary policy decision-
making? To answer this question, we compute optimal parameter values of a Taylor-type rule,
using two simple area-wide and multi-country models for the three largest economies in the
euro area, and compare the corresponding optimized loss functions. The results suggest that
the welfare under performance of an area-wide modelling approach is likely to be far from
triﬂing.
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∗ Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction and main ﬁndings
1
Theintroduction of the singlecurrency in anumber of European countries on 1st January
1999 and the establishment of a single monetary authority for the euro area have raised a
number of novel challenges for European policy-makers, economic scholars and practitioners
alike. As regards speciﬁcally the implications for monetary policy, they have naturally been
remarkably deep: anewmonetary policy strategy hasbeen adopted, newoperating instruments
havebeen put in place, and new tools and procedureshavebeen developed to support monetary
policy decision-making.
Concerning speciﬁcally tools and procedures, it is clear that conducting monetary policy
for the euro area as a whole requires that short-term assessments, medium-term projections
and policy analyses – previously run on a country-by-country basis – should now be extended
to cover consistently all economies in the area.
2
Regarding the tools to be used in those contexts, the following basic issue has to be
faced: can the euro area monetary policy-maker safely rely on forecasts and policy analyses
thatarebasedonanarea-widemodellingapproach(i.e., anapproachthattreatsaggregatetime-
series for all countries in the area as if they referred to just one large single economy)? Or,
alternatively, should euro area monetary policy-making be based on a multi-country modelling
approach (that consists in using disaggregate data to build inter-linked single-country models
for the various countries)? One’s preference is bound to go to the second approach, to the
extent that signiﬁcant structural differences still persist among the economies in the area.
This issue may be, and frequently has been, addressed from a statistical and econometric
viewpoint byinvestigating theextentof thedifferences in economicstructures, and particularly
in the monetary transmission mechanisms, of the countries participating in the euro area. A
large and ever-growing body of evidence is available on these issues, the main goal usually
being a different one, i.e., to assess whether the single monetary policy is likely to have
1 We thank Andrea Brandolini, Riccardo Cristadoro, Marco Lippi, Daniele Terlizzese and participants in a
workshop at the Banque de France for many helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of
Italy. Email: monteforte.libero@insedia.interbusiness.it; siviero.stefano@insedia.interbusiness.it.
2 Indeed, the tools and procedures currently underlying the Eurosystem macroeconomic projections have
been carefully designed, starting prior to the introduction of the single currency, to meet that requirement; for a
description see ECB (2001).8
different macroeconomic effects in the various countries because of asymmetries among the
economies in thearea.
3 Most studiesindicatethat relevant asymmetries still exist, andthat they
are likely to reﬂect deep structural differences.
4 Albeit serving a different purpose from the
one we have here, those ﬁndings tentatively suggest that a multi-country modelling approach
is preferable to an area-wide one.
More formally, one may test whether or not parameter estimates based on aggregate
data for the area as a whole are affected by aggregation bias.
5 Monteforte (2002) has recently
argued, on the basis of aggregation tests computed with the models used for the experiments
presented in this paper, that on the whole the empirical evidence does call for a rebuttal of the
hypothesis that econometric modelling of aggregate euro area data is a statistically appropriate
modelling strategy.
One might nevertheless tentatively conjecture that, while an aggregate modelling
strategy may well be inappropriate from a statistical viewpoint – as it overlooks a number
of differences in economic structures – it may still be “good enough” for any practical
purposes. In other words, one might speculate that the evidence of statistically signiﬁcant
structural differences indicated by aggregation bias tests does not per se entail that an area-
wide modelling approach would provide the monetary policy-maker with unreliable analyses
3 A (very) partial list of recent works that have a bearing on this issue includes Dornbusch, Favero and
Giavazzi (1998), Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997), Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terlizzese (1999), Hughes Hallett
and Piscitelli (1999), Dedola and Lippi (2000), Clements, Kontolemis and Levy (2001), Ciccarelli and Rebucci
(2002), and the papers presented at a recent ECB conference (“Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area”,
ECB, Frankfurt, 18-19 December 2001).
4 On the structural determinants of the observed asymmetries, not much is available in the literature yet.
Fragmentary evidence may be found in van Els, Locarno, Morgan and Villetelle (2001).
5 The econometric literature on aggregation bias does not univocally predict that using disaggregate data
is preferable to relying on the corresponding aggregates (see, e.g., Barker and Pesaran (1990) Lippi and Forni
(1990), Pesaran, Pierse and Kumar (1989) for extensive reviews of all related issues). It is well known, ever
since Theil (1954) at least , that an aggregate modelling approach is the preferable one if either the structural
parameters of the disaggregate models are all the same, or if compositional stability holds. Since these conditions
are usually found not to hold in practice, aggregation bias is a very frequent occurrence. Hence, a disaggregate
approach is generally advisable. Grunfeld and Griliches (1960) show that this is no longer true if one considers
the possibility of measurement errors and/or misspeciﬁcation of the disaggregate relationships. In our case,
it is unlikely that these latter arguments apply: national statistics are themselves the result of aggregating a
large number of primary data; while the statistical criteria underlying national data are well established, the
choice of the most appropriate aggregating functions to be used in constructing euro area ﬁgures is an issue still
under debate (see, e.g., Winder (1997), Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2000) and Labhard, Weeken and Westaway
(2001)); there is long experience in the econometric modelling of individual countries; ﬁnally, multi-country
modelling may take into account a number of relevant aspects (e.g., cross-country trade links) that either are not
well-deﬁned or are hard to incorporate in an aggregate model.9
and insight. This would be the case if it were possible to show that the welfare loss incurred
by a hypothetical policy-maker relying on the information provided by an aggregate model is
likely not to be signiﬁcantly different from the welfare loss incurred by a policy-maker relying
on disaggregate econometric tools. If no big welfare losses were at the stake, the area-wide
approach would clearly be preferable for a number of obvious reasons (e.g., parsimony and
transparency).
6
In this paper we tackle the issue of choosing an econometric modelling strategy for
the euro area from the viewpoint outlined above. Speciﬁcally, we measure the size of the
additional welfarecostthat would beincurredby theeuro areapolicy-makerifmonetary policy
decisions relied on an area-wide modelling approach, rather than a multi-country one.
7
Ourapproachmay besketchily describedasfollows: ﬁrst, wecomputeoptimal monetary
policy rules subject to the assumption that the euro area economy can be satisfactorily
described by an aggregate area-wide model (Aggregate Euro Area Model, AEAM), or,
alternatively, by a disaggregate multi-country one (Disaggregate Euro Area Model, DEAM).
The choice was made to compute optimal Taylor-type rules, in which the policy-controlled
interest rate reacts only to current inﬂation and a measure of the output gap; in addition, the
rule is allowed to include an instrument-smoothing term. Second, using the structure and the
variance-covariance matrix of the DEAM, we assess the welfare losses associated with either
the AEAM-based rule or the DEAM-based one. The choice of comparing both rules based on
t h eD E A Mi sj u s t i ﬁed by the empirical evidence brieﬂy recalled above, and in particular the
results presented in Monteforte (2002), where it is shown that the conditions for aggregability
do not hold for inﬂation and output gap euro area data. Third, we compare the welfare losses.
6 An obvious objection comes mind: why should one be concerned about this issue only as far as the
euro area is concerned? Why is it that this issue has never been raised, at least as far as we know, for other
monetary unions? There is hardly any doubt that heterogeneity among euro area countries is widely presumed
to be considerably more pronounced than in other monetary unions or federal states (the US naturally coming to
mind), largely because of differences in the institutional structures of participating countries, which are expected
to persist, at least to a certain extent, for some time into the future. Hence, one may conjecture that the potential
loss associated with the use of aggregate econometric tools is likely to be larger for the euro area than for other
economies. Whether this is indeed the case is precisely the issue we tackle.
7 Itshouldbeemphasizedthat, inreality, theprocess throughwhichEurosystemdecisions aremadedoes not
strictly correspond to either of the two extreme hypothetical cases that, for the sake of the argument, we contrast
and compare in this paper. As described in ECB (2001), both area-wide and multi-country tools, developed by
both the ECB and NCBs, are being used for forecasting and policy analysis purposes. Thus, the possibility that
relyingexclusively on area-wide tools might be sub-optimal was implicitly recognized when the forecasting tools
used and the procedures now followed by the Eurosystem were designed.10
If the difference between the two were triﬂing, then one could conclude that an area-wide
modelling approach is a reasonable choice when it comes to supporting the single monetary
policy; vice versa, if the differences were sizeable, it would be wiser to resort to the DEAM.
Hence, in a way, our approach may be viewed as an indirect method of testing whether the
convenient simpliﬁcation of aggregability can be maintained.
The foregoing description reveals that our approach has, by construction, a clear
implicationabouttherankingofthetworules: theDEAM-basedruleisboundnottobeinferior
to the AEAM-based one. The issue then becomes one of size: by how much is the DEAM-
based rule preferable to the alternative? Because of the inevitable superiority of the DEAM,
we not only compute the difference in the performance of the two rules, but also appraise the
signiﬁcance and robustness of that difference, taking into account both the stochastic structure
of the DEAM’s disturbances and that of its estimated parameters. Moreover we assess how the
main results would be affected should the national stochastic disturbance processes become
increasingly homogeneous across countries.
Our ﬁndings suggests that the additional welfare losses that are incurred by relying on
an aggregate modelling approach (as opposed to a disaggregate one) are all but triﬂing. On the
whole, we believe that our conclusions, while obviously model-dependent, are satisfactorily
robust with respect to a number of sensitivity analyses, and suggest that this issue is worth
investigating further, possibly using more realistic and fully-ﬂedged models of the euro area
economy; we conjecture that this would, if anything, reinforce our results.
This paper may be viewed as complementing some recent contributions focusing on
optimal monetary policy rules for the euro area.
De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001) use a multi-country model to compute optimal
monetary policy rules for the euro area under two different assumptions regarding the loss
function: (i) the loss function depends on aggregate inﬂation and output gap (aggregate loss-
function); (ii) the loss function is given by a weighted average of the individual countries’ loss
function, the arguments of the latter being, again, inﬂation and the output gap (multi-country
loss function). Their (comforting) ﬁnding is that the second speciﬁcation of the loss function,
while clearly inconsistent with the Eurosystem’s primary objective as speciﬁed in the ECB’s
Statute, would lead to approximately the same outcome as what they label “aggregate data
targeting.”11
Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero and Terlizzese(2002) focus on the rolethat can beplayed
byinformationat the national level in settingthe single monetary policy of the euro area. They
ﬁnd that the performance of a central bank that chooses the nominal interest rate to minimize a
standard quadratic loss function of area-wide inﬂation and output gap signiﬁcantly improves if
the reaction function includes national variables – as opposed to the case in which the interest
rate reacts to area-wide variables only.
Our paper shares the same key assumption as De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001) and
Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero and Terlizzese (2002) as far as the Data Generating Process
(DGP) is concerned: speciﬁcally, we postulate that the DGP is more accurately described by
theDEAM.Onthebasisofthismaintainedassumption, weassessthewelfarelossesassociated
with following an area-wide modelling approach.
Table 1 schematically describes the issues explored in the three papers.
Table 1
Issues explored in the recent literature on euro area monetary policy decision-making.
Paper Loss function Data Generating Process Model Rule
DGP MC MC MC MC
(2001) AW
ADGST AW MC MC MC
(2002) AW
This paper AW MC AW AW=f(AW model)
MC AW=f(MC model)
Legenda: AW=area-wide; MC=multi-country; DGP= De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001); ADGST=Angelini, Del Giovane,
Siviero and Terlizzese (2002); bold letters are used to highlight the speciﬁc AW-MC trade-off examined in each of
the three papers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two basic modelling options
available to support monetary policy-making in the euro area and presents the main features
of the stylized aggregate-demand/aggregate-supply AEAM and DEAM used in the remainder
of the paper; a full listing of both models is provided in the appendices. Section 3 outlines
the experimental design (see above for a short description). The results of our experiments are
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 draws some tentative conclusions as to what we believe our12
results imply concerning the choice of a modelling approach to support euro area monetary
policy-making.
2. Simple area-wide and multi-country models for the euro area
A modeller wishing to build empirical tools for forecasting and policy analysis purposes
in the euro area faces two basic options: as a ﬁrst alternative, one could build a multi-
country model, i.e., a model that describes the functioning of the economic mechanisms in
the individual countries of the area and the inter-linkages amongst them. A model of this
kind may of course allow for idiosyncratic factors to be taken into account for individual
countries, so that any country-speciﬁc features may be reﬂected by either the structure of
the model and/or the value of the estimated parameters. In the course of forecast and policy
analysis exercises, area-wide economic developments would then be computed by aggregating
the individual country results. As a second, much less onerous, alternative, one may ﬁrst
aggregate the individual country data
8 and model the latter as if they referred to one single,
homogeneous economy.
Both approaches are being pursued in practice, even by the same institutions. For
instance, the Eurosystem projections, which have been published by the ECB since December
2000, are the result of a multi-staged process that involves aggregating country-speciﬁc
projections (mostly based on the national models of participating NCBs) while also using
information derived from the ECB’s Area-Wide Model (AWM),
9 to come to one single,
consistent picture (see ECB (2001)).
The advantages of adopting an area-wide approach are obvious: an area-wide model
is more parsimonious, less costly, more readily available, arguably more transparent.
Unfortunately, snappiness often comes at a cost.
Monteforte (2002) tackles the issue of the choice between the two approaches outlined
above from a statistical viewpoint, testing whether one may model aggregate data for the
euro area without incurring signiﬁcant bias and loss of information, the term of comparison
8 Labhard, Weeken andWestaway (2001)arguethatthe actual choiceoftheaggregating functionis unlikely
to affect signiﬁcantly the properties of the model. Full details as to the aggregating function(s) adopted in this
paper are provided in the appendices.
9 For a description of the structure and properties of the AWM see Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001).13
being working with disaggregate data. Empirical testing shows that there are considerable
information losses to be incurred in following an area-wide modelling approach. Speciﬁcally,
Monteforte (2002) developed two separate models for the three largest economies in the euro
area (Germany, France and Italy, covering some 70 per cent of the area GDP). In both models
the functioning of the economy is described by just two equations: (i) a Phillips curve (or
aggregate supply equation), modelling inﬂation as a function of the output gap; (ii) an IS
curve (or aggregate demand equation), that determines the output gap as a function of the
real short-term interest rate. The ﬁrst model (AEAM) uses aggregate data; the second model
(DEAM), on the contrary, speciﬁes a two-equation sub-model for each of the three countries
(so that it comprises 6 equations altogether), and includes a number of inter-linkages among
the three sub-models
10 as well as two identities that deﬁne area-wide aggregates.
11 Formally
testing for aggregation bias, Monteforte (2002) ﬁnds that the data are sharply in favor of the
disaggregate modelling.
A detailed description of those models is beyond the objective of this work (although a
complete listing of both models is provided in the appendices). To provide some insight into
the properties of the models, Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the impulse responses of both models
to a number of shocks. Since the Phillips curve is vertical in both models, neither of them
would be stable if they were not augmented with a stabilizing policy rule. To compute impulse
10 In particular, inﬂation in any of the three countries may depend on “imported inﬂation”fromtheother two
(imported inﬂation, in turn, reﬂects not only foreign inﬂation, but also, in the estimation sample, the dynamics of
the bilateral exchange rates); similarly, the cyclical position of any of the three economies may depend – because
of the intense trade linkages amongst the three countries – on the cyclical positions of the other two.
11 The simple models presented in this section are entirely backward-looking and their parameters cannot
be given a structural interpretation in terms of “deep” underlying parameters relating to preferences and technol-
ogy. Hence, they are clearly potentially affected by the well-known difﬁculties associated with the evaluation
of policy changes on the basis of behavioural relationships found to hold under a different policy set-up (Lucas
(1976)). There are, however, several general reasons to believe that the Lucas Critique may in practice be less
disruptive than is widely held. First, the behaviour of economic agents may be backward-looking rather than
forward-looking, the latter being a key ingredient in Lucas-type non-structurality. It is thus possible to test em-
pirically which of the two behavioural schemes is indeed appropriate (Hendry (1988) and Favero and Hendry
(1992)). Second, even if the agents’ expectation formation process is assumed to be forward-looking, the pos-
sibility exists that, because the equilibrium is indeterminate, one may still specify rational and “Lucas-proof”
decisional rules (Farmer (1991)). Third, the institutional changes or policy measures in question could not be the
“regime shifts” that are needed for the Lucas Critique to apply (Sims (1982)). Finally, even if each individual
agent were to modify her/his decisional rule as a consequence of a policy regime shift, the aggregation of hetero-
geneous reactions may result in an aggregate response that is much less pronounced than each of the underlying
individual reactions, so that the actual, aggregate macroeconomic effects of a policy change may well be bet-
ter approximated by an approach that disregards the inherent non-structurality (Altissimo, Siviero and Terlizzese
(1999)). In our speciﬁc case, the empirical evidence presented below overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis
of structural stability, even for the most recent period, when, arguably, a major shock to the policy regime took
place.14
responses, both models were supplemented with the same monetary policy reaction function.
Speciﬁcally, a Taylor-type rule, with coefﬁcients 1.5, 0.5 and 0.5, for current inﬂation, the
output gap and the lagged interest rate, respectively, was added to both models. As shown
by the results reported in the ﬁgures, both models are stable, although even temporary shocks
may result in very persistent deviations from equilibrium.
12
The results show a number of similarities between the AEAM and the DEAM. First, in
both models the effects of the shocks are rather long-lasting. Second, a shock to the aggregate
supply equation induces a (dampened) oscillatory response of both inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate. Third, the general pattern of responses is very similar across models: e.g., a
Phillips curve shock induces a contraction of output that reaches its maximum, in both models,
in the third and fourth years after the shock; similarly, a (temporary) increase in the policy-
controlledinterest rate resultsina temporarycontractionof output that reaches its maximum at
the end of the ﬁrst year after the shock (moreover, the size of the contraction is roughly similar
for the two models). Fourth, the response of inﬂation to a monetary policy shock comes with
a further lag with respect to the reaction of output (the lag is somewhat more pronounced in
the case of the DEAM).
The results, however, also signal several relevant differences. First, according to the
DEAM the economy takes a longer time to get back to equilibrium after being hit by a shock.
Second, the size of the responses is usually larger for the DEAM model (e.g., while the
contractionary effect of an aggregate supply shock reaches a maximum, for both models, in
the third and fourth years after the shock, the reaction of output in the DEAM is about three
times as large as in the AEAM; also, the DEAM is more reactive to monetary policy as far as
inﬂation is concerned, while it is somewhat less sensitive than the AEAM if one considers the
effects on the output gap). Third, because of the overall more pronounced impact of aggregate
supply and aggregate demand shocks on the economy, monetary policy is more activist in
the DEAM, notwithstanding the fact that both models were augmented with exactly the same
Taylor-type rule.
12 For both the aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations, the shock amounts to one standard devi-
ation of the corresponding estimation residuals. In the case of a monetary policy shock, the short-term interest
rate is raised (for just one period) by 100 basis points.15
3. Design of experiments
Our experiments must be designed so as to mimic the following two hypothetical cases:
(i) the European monetary policy-maker relies on the AEAM; (ii) monetary policy-making
relies, instead, on the DEAM.
Accordingly, we compute two distinct monetary policy rules for the euro area: (i) a rule
in which the optimal parameter values are computed on the basis of the set of constraints given
by the AEAM; (ii) a rule whose optimal parameter values are computed on the basis of the
DEAM.
It would of course be possible to compute fully optimal instrument rules (i.e., rules that
exploit all the information provided by the whole set of state variables, which we label FO
rules) for both the AEAM and the DEAM. However, the vector of state variables is different
for the two models (in particular, it is larger for the DEAM than for the AEAM). For the
sake of making the comparison as fair as possible, the two rules should be put on an equal
footing. To this end, our experimental design restricts them both to be Taylor-type rules, and
further requires that the hypothetical policy-maker who relies on the DEAM only respond to
area-wide aggregates.
13 To sum up, we postulate that both hypothetical policy-makers set the
current value of the policy interest rate on the basis of current area-wide inﬂation and output
gap and of the lagged value of the policy instrument.
Inbothcases, astandardtime-separablequadraticlossfunction isassumed, itsarguments
being the euro area average inﬂation rate and output gap, and a term that attaches a cost to the







t+τ + λ · y
2
t+τ + µ · (∆it+τ)
2] (1)
where δ is a discount factor, and λ and µ are parameters that reﬂect the policy-maker’s
preferences (the weight on deviations of inﬂation from its target is normalized to 1); πt+1
is the (euro area average) quarter-on-quarter consumer inﬂation rate; yt+1 is the output gap;
it+1 is the short-term policy-controlled interest rate.
13 In Angelini, Del Giovane, Sivieroand Terlizzese(2002), whereonly theDEAM modelis used, the policy-
maker is also allowed to respond to country-speciﬁc variables.16
It is worth stressing that our speciﬁcation of the loss function implies that the euro area
policy-maker is only interested in euro area average outcomes, and hence is consistent with
the ofﬁcial Eurosystem’s view of the monetary policy objective and strategy.
For δ → 1 the sum in eq. (1) becomes unbounded; however, following Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999), p. 215, “the value of the inter-temporal loss function approaches the inﬁnite
sumoftheunconditionalmeansoftheperiod lossfunction”; thisimpliesthatonecan ”interpret
the inter-temporal loss function as the unconditional mean of the period loss function, “which
is given by the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of the target variables:
Lt = var[πt]+λ · var[yt]+µ · var[∆it] (2)
In the following we adopt the loss function deﬁned as in eq.(2). The quest for optimal
policy was repeated with a wide range of values for λ and µ, ranging from a case in which
the monetary policy-maker is only interested in inﬂation (λ = µ =0 ) to the opposite
extreme, in which the policy-maker attaches a very high cost to deviations of the output gap
from its equilibrium value (zero) and to the volatility of the policy-controlled interest rate
(λ = µ =3 ).
14
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s.to: • AEAM (see Appendix 1)
• it = γA
1 · πt + γA
2 · yt + γA
3 · it−1
14 The ranges chosen for the loss function parameters are similar to the ones typically assumed in the litera-


















t+τ + λ · y2
t+τ + µ · (∆it+τ)2]
s.to: • DEAM (see Appendix 2)
• it = γM
1 · πt + γM
2 · yt + γM
3 · it−1
Let us now tackle the crucial issue of how the performance of these two rules may
be compared. On the one hand, it is by construction the case that a rule obtained from
optimizing of the objective function under the assumption that the constraints are given by
the DEAM will outperform the alternative rule (computed on the basis of the AEAM) if the
performance of both rules is assessed on the basis of the DEAM, and vice versa. On the
other hand, a comparison is only sensible if both rules are made to compete within the same
framework. Consistently with the conclusions of virtually all relevant empirical literature –
pointing to sizeable differences in the responses of the economies participating in the euro
area to a number of shocks, and particularly to monetary policy ones – and with the ﬁndings
of Monteforte (2002) – suggesting that aggregation bias affects aggregate estimates – the
maintained assumption in the remainder of this paper is that the economy of the euro area is
more accurately described by the DEAM. In the light of the foregoing arguments, it is on the
basis of the DEAM that the performance of the competing monetary policy rules we compute
will be assessed and compared.
15.
The issue then becomes: by how much does the DEAM-based rule outperform the
AEAM-based one? Note that, while our experimental design has by construction a clear
implicationas to the ranking of thetworules, it does not a priori implythat their performances
should necessarily be remarkably different. At any rate, we investigate not only the size of the
difference in the performance of the two rules, but also its signiﬁcance.
We further compute, as a benchmark, the fully optimal instrument rule (based on
the DEAM) and the associated optimized variances.
16 This third set of results is used to
15 Speciﬁcally, wecomputetheunconditionalvariances ofinﬂationand outputgapon thebasisoftheDEAM
andthecorrespondingvariance-covariancematrix of residuals, imposingthatthe parameters of therules arethose
derived with the DEAM itself, or, alternatively, that they are the AEAM-based ones.
16 For this purpose, we ﬁrst derive the state-space representation of the DEAM, and then solve a standard18
assess whether the gains associated with following a DEAM-based rule are signiﬁcant when
compared with the (larger) gains that could be attained by relying on the truly optimal one.
Following an approach similar to the one suggested by De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001),
optimal parameters for the AEAM-based and DEAM-based rules are also computed under
different assumptions regarding the stochastic process generating the stochastic disturbances.
It is worth noting, before we brieﬂy describe those additional experiments, that the variance-
covariance matrix of the historical residuals of the DEAM may be seen as consisting of two
main diagonal blocks: the ﬁrst one gives the variance-covariance matrix of the stochastic
elements of the Phillips curve sub-block in the three countries; the second block contains
the variances and covariances of the stochastic terms of the aggregate demand functions in the
three countries. The elements of the off-diagonal blocks in the historical variance-covariance
matrix are all very small. Indeed, assuming that they are all zero does not signiﬁcantly change
the results. The alternative assumption we formulate is that, once full convergence is reached,
all stochastic processes that belong to the same diagonal block are exactly the same; their
(common and identical) variance (as well as covariances) is given by a (sort of) weighted
average of the three corresponding historical variances.
17 We also consider a range of less-
than-full convergence. The alternative assumption just described may be viewed as a way to
mimicking, in an admittedly very extreme and hence unrealistic fashion, the possibility that
euro area economies become increasingly similar, if not in their structures, at least insofar as
the exogenous shocks hitting the economies are concerned. Indeed, to the extent that themajor
source of asymmetric shocks before 1999 was exchange rates,
18 postulating some convergence
of the stochastic processes seems sensible.
stochastic linear regulator problem (see Chow (1970), Sargent (1987), and, for an application to the issue of
optimal monetary policy design, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)). For the sake of brevity, we omit the technical
details here.
17 More precisely, as in De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001), the average variances are calculated as squared
weighted sums of the standard deviations of the country-speciﬁc Phillips curve and aggregate demand shocks.
18 One may indeed conjecture that pre-1999 disturbance asymmetries reﬂected the different behavior of the
exchange rates vis-à-vis the rest of the world (by contrast, the bilateral exchange rates among the three countries
we consider are included in the estimated Phillips curve equations and so cannot be, by construction, a source of
the observed asymmetries in stochastic residuals).19
4. The results
4.1 Basic ﬁndings
The main results of our experiments are shown in Figure 4 and Table 2.
Let us focus ﬁrst on the ﬁnal outcome of the two competing rules (Figure 4). The top
chart of the ﬁgure reports the percentage reduction in the optimized value of the objective
function if the DEAM-based rule is followed instead of the AEAM-based one. The welfare
gains appear to be far from negligible, ranging from a minimum of about 10 per cent (when
both λ and µ are close to zero; note, however, that the case of pure inﬂation targeting results
in a welfare gain of almost 20 per cent) to over 32 per cent; they tend to exceed 20 per cent
as soon as the policy-maker’s preference structure is postulated to attach a non-zero cost to
instrument volatility and/or to deviations of the output gap from zero. The key message given
by the ﬁgure is that ignoring the structural differences among the euro area economies, and so
adopting a model that treats them as a single and homogeneous “whole,” would lead to a very
sizeable worsening of the performance of monetary policy, particularly when thepolicy-maker
pays some attention to output and is concerned about excessive interest rate variability.
In principle, for given preferences, the loss function is identiﬁe do n l yu pt oap o s i t i v e
linear transformation: hence, it could be argued that the actual size of the percentage loss
reduction could be made as little, or as large, as desired, simply by applying an appropriate
transformation. However, the results may be appraised in such away as to defuse this potential
criticism.
First, one may appraise the loss function reduction in relative terms, using the FO rule
as a benchmark. The bottom chart of Figure 4 shows that the hypothetical policy-maker
relying on the DEAM would go a long way towards reducing the distance (measured in
terms of welfare) between a policy rule based on the AEAM and the optimal instrument rule.
Speciﬁcally, for λ = µ =0the DEAM-based rule makes up for almost 70 per cent of the total
distance (in terms of optimized loss functions) between the AEAM-based rule and the FO one.
As before, this becomes less evident in the immediate neighborhood of λ = µ =0(where the
ﬁguredropsto 20-30 per cent), but it becomes onceagain sizeable for most other combinations
of preference parameters (most ﬁgures being comprised between 40 and 60 per cent). Thus,
not only is the size of the gains that can be attained with a multi-country modelling approach20
far from negligible, but adopting the true optimum rule as a benchmark, those gains are even
more considerable.
Second, the results can be assessed directly in terms of the optimized unconditional
standard deviations of inﬂation, the output gap and interest ratechanges. This is donein Figure
5, showing the optimal inﬂation/output gap frontier (in terms of optimized standard deviations
of those variables) for the AEAM-based, DEAM-based and FO rules. The frontiers have been
computed, for given µ, by letting λ take a grid of values between 0 (north-west) and 3 (south-
east). As a further benchmark, we also report the inﬂation/output gap trade-off associated with
a standard Taylor rule with no instrument smoothing (i.e., with γ1 = 1.5,γ2 =0 .5 and γ3 =0
in our notation). While the frontier associated with the FO rule is positioned considerably to
the south-west with respect to the frontier associated with the DEAM-based rule, the latter
consistently attains a combination of inﬂation and output gap volatility that is sizeably better
than that of the AEAM-based rule. For no combination of preference parameters do the
performances of the DEAM-based and AEAM-based rules come close to one another. As
the cost attached to instrument volatility is raised, the relative performance of the DEAM-
based rule becomes better and better, conﬁrming the remarks made when discussing Figure 4
above. Moreover, as the weight of the output gap and the change in the interest rates in the
loss function increases, the performance of the DEAM-based rule become relatively closer to
that of the FO one.
Can one trace these outcomes back to the properties of the different optimal rules, and in
particular to the optimized parameters on inﬂation, the output gap and the lagged interest rate
in the monetary policy reaction functions? The latter are presented in Table 2.
19 The optimal
instrument rule obviously depends on the complete set of the 15 state variables in the DEAM:
the latter set comprises inﬂation and output gap in the various countries for different lags. For
ease of comparison, the coefﬁcient on inﬂation reported in Table 2 is given, for the optimal
instrument rule, by the sum of the value of all coefﬁcients that the rule assigns to inﬂation in
all countries and for all lags; similarly for the output gap.
A number of features are noteworthy in that table. First, the optimized parameters of the
DEAM-based rule come generally much closer to the corresponding optimized parameters in
19 Table 2 does not show the results for the cases in which either µ or λ are exactly zero. While a solution
may be computed for any of those cases, the resulting coefﬁcients are not plausible, as they differ dramatically
from any estimates that may be computed on the basis of the observed behavior of the monetary policy-maker.21
the optimal instrument rule, while those of the AEAM-based rule are often distant. Consider,
for instance, the ﬁrst set of loss function weights (λ = µ =0 .1): the fully optimal parameter
on inﬂation is 1.00; for the DEAM-based rule, the corresponding value is 0.86, while for
the AEAM-based rule it is as low as 0.59. Similarly for the output gap, and for all other
combinations of loss function weights. Second, the AEAM-based rule is consistently not
“reactive” enough to either inﬂation or the output gap compared with the other two rules. On
the whole, the features commented so far are consistent with the relative performance of the
three rules as shown in Figures 4 and 5.
It may be instructive to examine the response of the DEAM to a number of different
shocksifmonetary policy-makingisassumedto beconducted onthebasisofthethreedifferent
rules alternatively. This is done, for one particular choice of the preference parameters, in
Figures 6, 7 and 8. In light of the foregoing remarks, it is hardly surprising that the responses
of the model under the DEAM-based and FO rules do not, in general, differ much from one
another, as compared with the behavior of the model under the AEAM-based rule. Generally
speaking, the latter induces a more pronounced oscillatory behavior compared with the other
tworules, especially inresponsetoaPhillips curveshock; it isworthnotingthat the instrument
volatility is also comparatively large. It may be conjectured that a multi-country modelling
approach results in a more complicated dynamic structure than is detected by an area-wide
modelling approach:
20 because of the AEAM’s simpler dynamics, setting a rule on the basis
of the latter results in dynamic responses that differ signiﬁcantly from the optimal ones.
4.2 Testing the signiﬁcance of the results
The results presented so far suggest that, were the euro area policy-maker to formulate
his/her decision on the basis of the indications of an aggregate area-wide model, he/she would
be likely to incur non-negligible welfare losses as opposed to the case in which he/she relied
on a multi-country tool. However, while the size of the welfare gains that are at stake appear
to be large, it remains to be establish whether they are signiﬁcant from a statistical viewpoint.
To tackle this issue, we perform two stochastic simulation exercises. In the ﬁrst we
compute, for a (large) number of realizations of the stochastic disturbances (drawn from
20 Indeed, itis well-known thatthedynamicsofaggregateseriesare, ingeneral, muchmorecomplicatedthan
the dynamics of the elementary series from which the aggregate data are computed, although it may be difﬁcult,
in practice, to detect statistically the signiﬁcance of all lagged variable values that should in principle be included
in the estimated aggregate relationship.22
the distribution of the estimation residuals), the value of the objective function under the
alternative assumptions that the optimal rule is computed on the basis of the AEAM or the
DEAM. The second exercise is similar, except that we sample from the stochastic distribution
of the estimated parameters.
Focusing on the ﬁrst exercise, we extract 1,000 replications from the set of estimated
residuals and simulate the model, for each replication, under either one or the other of the
two competing rules. Each replication consists of 800 realizations of the shocks for the six
stochastic equations in the model, one realization per period. Although the model is simulated
for 800 periods, only the average outcomes in the last 400 periods are used to evaluate
the objective function. This is done to prevent the results from being biased by the initial
conditions (we begin simulating the model from a situation of equilibrium; by scrapping the
ﬁrst 400 results, the simulated variance of the objective variables should provide a reasonable
approximation of their unconditional variance which indeed turns out to be the case). This we
repeat for all combinations of preference parameters in the welfare function.
For all combinations of preference parameters, the DEAM-based rule delivers a better
outcome thanthe alternative in the overwhelmingmajority of replications (for mostpreference
parameters, the ﬁgure is comprised between 80 and 85 per cent, the lowest ﬁgure being almost
75 per cent whenλ =0and µ =0 .1,thehighest being virtually 100 percent in thecase of pure
inﬂation targeting; see the top chart of Figure 9). Hence, not only is the gain large on average,
it is also systematic. The bottom chart of Figure 9 also shows that, for most combinations of
preference parameters, the welfare gain associated with the DEAM-based rule amounts to at
least 20 per cent of the loss associated with the AEAM-based rule in 50 to 60 per cent of all
replications, with the exception of a neighborhood around (but not including) λ = µ =0(the
lowest ﬁgure being around 15 per cent).
We also formally tested the hypothesis that the average welfare loss associated with
following the DEAM-based rule is lower than the average loss with the AEAM-based rule (the
test is a one-sided test based on comparing the averages of the objective function outcomes
associated with either one or the other of the two rules for all 1,000 replications).
21 The results
are overwhelmingly supportive of the hypothesis: for all combinations of policy parameters
the tail probability of the test is virtually zero.
21 The test is based on the standard statistic for the equality of the means of normally distributed variables.23
Overall, these results indicate that the gain associated with adopting the DEAM-based
rule is not only large, but also signiﬁcantly so, and systematic, moreover.
The second exercise explicitly accounts for the stochastic nature of the estimated model
coefﬁcients. In the previous paragraph, as well as in much of the literature on policy rules,
the model used to derive and appraise the optimal rules is assumed to describe accurately
the functioning of the economy. Actually, the most one could argue is that with a certain
probability the “true” model parameters lie in the neighborhood of the estimated ones. It could
then be that their variance-covariance matrix is so “large” as to make whatever differences
one ﬁnds between the performances of competing rules statistically irrelevant. In a sense, this
exercise can be interpreted as a check on the robustness of our main result: indeed, we check
whether the latter would survive were the “true” model somewhat different from the one used
to derive the two rules. Theneed for such a check is particularly acutein thecaseat hand, since
we compare the performance of the DEAM-based and AEAM-based rules by computing the
respectivelossfunctionsundertheassumptionthat theDEAMisthetruemodel, an assumption
that, while justiﬁed by the empirical ﬁndings recalled earlier, has a clear implication as to the
ranking of the two rules (although it says nothing about their distance).
Inmoredetail, to accountforthevariabilityof theestimated coefﬁcientsweextract 5,000
replications from the empirical distribution of the estimated DEAM coefﬁcients and, without
re-computing the DEAM-based and AEAM-based rules, we compute, for each replication
of the model coefﬁcients, the associated loss function (almost half of the replications had to
be discarded, as they produced explosive estimates of the unconditional variance-covariance
matrix with either the DEAM-based or the AEAM-based rules, and in general with both; see
below for more details). We then examine the distribution of the loss function under the two
rules. These steps are repeated for 49 combinations of values of the preference parameters λ
and µ.
Aﬁrstsetof results is showninFigure 10(topchart). Itcanbe seen thatin(almost) 70to
80 per cent of all the “alternative worlds” that are plausible given the estimate of the DEAM,
the DEAM-based rule does strictly better than the AEAM-based one for any combination
of preference parameters. Hence, coefﬁcient variability is not such as to jeopardize our
conclusions above. For 35 to over 50 per cent of the replications (depending on the particular
combination of preference parameters) the DEAM-based rule delivers a reduction of the loss24
function of at least 20 per cent (bottom chart of Figure 10). Overall, it seems safe to conclude
that the results are systematic across “alternative worlds” (as long as the latter are statistically
compatible with the estimated DEAM), and the gains are large relatively often.
Finally, as in the exercise above, we formally test the hypothesis that the average (across
replications) welfare loss associated with the DEAM-based rule is lower than the average loss
obtainablewith theAEAM-basedone(Figure11). Exceptin thecaseof pureinﬂationtargeting
and its immediate neighborhood, one is not able to reject the null hypothesis with a conﬁdence
level ofat most 10 percent(actually, for threequartersofthe49combinationsofthepreference
parameters for which the statistic was computed the tail probability is virtually zero). The few
rejections reﬂect the fact that some of the individual drawings of the parameters of the model
result in extreme outcomes, and arguably not fully realistic (e.g. the inﬂation process has
roots larger than 1 while at the same time the policy instrument becomes virtually ineffective).
Indeed, if those additional (few) outliers are eliminated, thetail probabilityof the test is always
much lower than 1 per cent for all preference parameters.
Overall, these results clearly indicate that, whatever the “true” data generating process,
the DEAM-based rule tends to be signiﬁcantly better than the AEAM-based alternative
(provided that our multi-country model is a reasonable approximation of the DGP). Not only
is the welfare loss associated with the AEAM-based rule large, but it is also statistically
signiﬁcant and generally “robust” to parameter uncertainty.
4.3 Stability testing
In the following we present some evidence regarding the stability of the parameters of
the DEAM and AEAM in the last few years, or lack thereof.
While the euro was ofﬁcially introduced only on January 1st, 1999, one may argue
that, at least since late 1996, the monetary policies for the three countries we consider had
been tightly constrained. The bilateral exchange rates remained basically constant at about
the same level as the irrevocable exchange rates with which those countries joined the euro
area two years later,
22 and the ﬁnancial markets considered it to be highly probable that those
countries would participate in the single courrency (with the exception, at least for 1997, of
22 In particular, Italy, having abandoned the ERM of the EMS in September 1992, re-joined it in late 1996 at
the same bilateral exchange rate with the DMas the one irrevocably ﬁxed when the euro was introduced in 1999.25
Italy). Moreover, ﬁscal policies were also tightly constrained by the convergence process.
Hence, we consider the whole period 1996-2001 as representative, at least approximately, of
what might happen in the near future in the euro era. For these reasons we argue that, if our
pre-euro models were to show any instabilities, those instabilities could be expected at least as
early as the beginning of 1997, which we take to be the beginning of the euro era.
Thus, we re-estimated both models using data from 1978.Q1 to 1996.Q4; for both
models, the parameter estimates are basically unchanged with respect to those obtained with
the original estimation sample (which included 1997 and 1998). We then tested over the ﬁve
years 1997-2001 the out-of-sample stability of the models estimated with data up to the end
of 1996. The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 13 and 14. For both models, the
empirical evidence overwhelmingly rejects the hypothesis of parameter instability; moreover,
few signs of convergence of the DEAM parameters can be detected. Actually, although
the coefﬁcient variability is negligible (as shown in Figure 14), it turns out that the cross-
country dispersion of a given parameter (say, the autoregressive term in the AD equation) is, if
anything, slightly higher using the whole sample up to 2001 than using the samples up to 1996
or 1998 (the only exception being that of the impact on interest rates in the AD equation, that
tends to be just slightly more similar across countries). Although these results clearly do not
rule out sizeable changes in the future, we can at least conclude that the relevance of country-
speciﬁc information for the conduct of the single monetary policy has not (yet?) faded and is
expected to remain at least in the near future.
23
The DEAM variance-covariance matrix computed with the 20 out-of-sample
observations suggests, by contrast, that the symmetry of shock has somewhat risen since 1996,
in particular for the disturbances in the AD equations. However, not too much emphasis
should be put on a variance-covariance matrix for 6 stochastic disturbances estimated with
just 20 observations, and one cannot reject the hypothesis that the matrix is the same as the
one computed in-sample with data up to 1996 or 1998 (both of the latter are almost-diagonal
matrices).
At any rate, taking the most recent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, we
computed the value of the objective function, using rules subject to DEAM and AEAM
23 This evidence is of course of relevance also from the viewpoint of the Lucas Critique. Although the
introduction of the euro can safely be deemed a major change in the policy rules, our simple model shows no sign
of instability of behavioral equations.26
estimated with data up to 1996. In other words, we investigated what would have happened
if optimal monetary policy rules computed on the basis of pre-euro models had been used in
the early stages of the euro era (which, as explained above, we take to have started in 1997;
as the model parameters are rather stable, we keep using the models estimated with data up to
the end of 1996). A priori, the results could come out either way: the under-performance of
the AEAM-based rule could be somewhat attenuated in comparison with the benchmark case
(becauseoftherecent highercross-countrycorrelation of shocks), or could bemagniﬁed (if the
pre-euro AEAM-based rule is less robust with respect to the change in the variance-covariance
matrix).
On average, the results tend to be about as unfavorable to the AEAM-based rule as in the
benchmark experiment, with the exception of a very small neighborhood around λ = µ =0
(but not including the latter point, where the welfare gain associated with using the DEAM-
based rule amounts to about 16 per cent). For λ = µ =0 .2 or higher, the welfare gain
stemming from following the DEAM-based rule ranges from 15 to 36 per cent.
To sum up, the recent evidence supports the claim that the gains associated with using
the DEAM-based rule, as opposed to the AEAM-based rule, have not started to diminish yet.
One tends to conjecture that they will remain non-negligible at least in the near future.
4.4 What could be ahead?
Despite the evidence presented above, in this paragraph we explore how the comparison
between the AEAM-based and DEAM-based rules would be affected were more symmetry of
stochastic disturbances to prevail among the euro area countries than detected in the past.
Of course, convergence of disturbances might occur (if at all) in many different ways: all
countries’ shocks could become similar to some average of what they are now; the stochastic
structure of the shocks of smaller countries could become more and more similar to that of the
l a r g e s to n e ;o rt h eﬁnal outcome of the convergence process could well be something that does
not at all resemble the current situation. In fact, there is no reason why convergence should
necessarily take place; moreover, there is no compelling evidence that much convergence has
taken place in the long run-up to the euro area.
24
24 Eichengreen (1997) and Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (1998), have tackled the issue of the symmetry of
theshockstotheEuropeaneconomies, orlackthereof;theirempiricalevidenceshowsthat, althoughtheEuropean
economies have followed rather similar policies in recent years, there is little evidence of a strengthening of the27
This leaves us with many ways to model convergence, and we have no clear-cut criterion
to offer as to which of them could be more plausible. Nevertheless, we believe that exploring
the sensitivity of our results to some form of convergence can be informative, even if the
eventual convergence process were to follow a different path.
To proceed, we will assume that countries that become more intimately tied to one
another tend to share the same shocks, and inﬂuence those common shocks proportionately to
their relative size (the largest country exerting a comparatively stronger effect on the common
shocks than the other two, and so on).
More in detail, we take full convergence of aggregate demand shocks to mean that
the disturbances in the aggregate demand equation become exactly the same in all countries
(hence, the cross-country correlation equals 1). As in De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001),
we assume that, once full convergence has been reached, the common variance (as well as




y|FC =( ωyGσyG + ωyFσyF + ωyIσyI)
2 (3)
where σ2
y|FC denotes the variance of the common AD shock under convergence; σyG,σyF,σyI
are the estimated standard deviation of AD disturbances in the three countries; ωyG,ωyF,ωyI
are the GDP weights of the three countries.
We also consider the possibility of partial convergence, which we assume to be
parameterized by ξAD, ranging from 0 (no convergence) to 1 (full convergence). For any given
choice of the ξAD parameter, the corresponding elements of the variance-covariance matrix of





y|FC+( 1 − ξAD)σ
2
yi (4)
σyjyi|PC = ξADσyi|PCσyj|PC (5)
for all i,j, so that the correlation of shocks among countries is given by ξAD itself.
25
degree of symmetry of the disturbances affecting the various economies.
25 It would, of course, be possible to introduce the further complication that the speed of convergence is not28
Full and partial convergence of aggregate supply disturbances are deﬁned in a similar
way, with the convergence process now parameterized by ξAS.
Turning to the results, under the extreme assumption that there are only two stochastic
processes in the euro area (speciﬁcally, one stochastic process driving Phillips curve shocks,
and one driving aggregate demand shocks, common to all countries), the under-performance
of the AEAM-based rule is considerably attenuated. Figure 14 reports, for thecase λ = µ = 1,
thelossfunctiongainthat canbeattained bymovingfromtheAEAM-based ruletotheDEAM-
based rule, as the degree of similarity of supply- and demand-side shocks across countries
increases (similar results are found for all other combinations of preference parameters).
26 The
gain in the event of no convergence amounts to some 25 per cent (which is obviously the same
value underlying the corresponding point in Figure 4). With full convergence of shocks, there
remainsvirtuallynoscopeat allforusingtheDEAM-basedrule. Note, however, thatasizeable
degree of (uniform) convergence is needed before the gain associated with using the DEAM-
based rule becomes relatively small; for instance, for that gain to fall below 10 per cent, there
must be at least ξAS = ξAD =0 .7. Examining what happens if the pace of convergence differs
on the supply- and demand-sides (i.e., looking at the off-diagonal elements in the ﬁgure), one
concludes that neither type of convergence is much more relevant than the other.
5. Conclusions: what implications for euro area econometric modelling?
The results presented in this paper support the conclusion that monetary policy in the
euro area is likely to be more effective if the econometric tools used to help monetary policy
decisions acknowledge the structural differences among the various economies in the area,
and so do not model aggregate euro area data as if they referred to one single, relatively
homogeneous economy. The differences in the economic structures of the various countries
the same for all countries. However, for the sake of simplicity we ignore that possibility. Let us just remark that
our concept of partial convergence tends to make cross-country heterogeneity disappear more smoothly than it
would be conceivably possible.
26 All rules perform less satisfactorily than in theset of experiments wherethehistorical variance-covariance
matrix was assumed to hold, the worsening being, of course, much more pronounced for the DEAM-based rule
(and for the optimal instrument one) than for the AEAM-based rule. A general worsening of the optimized losses
should indeed be expected: in the latter experiment the shocks are perfectly correlated, while the historical ones
are virtually independent, and hence do not tend to reinforce each other.29
appear to be pronounced enough to induce signiﬁcant aggregation errors in the parameter
estimates of an AEAM (Monteforte (2002)).
Our results show that aggregation error is not irrelevant from the viewpoint of policy-
making: an AEAM-based monetary policy rule is sizeably sub-optimal with respect to a
DEAM-based one.
The welfare losses associated with adopting and AEAM-based rule are not only sizeable
but also highly signiﬁcant.
Moreover, our results are generally robust with respect to model parameter variability.
Finally, while our investigation of possible instabilities of the model in the most recent
past does not suggest that euro area economies are becoming increasingly similar to one
another, we nevertheless probe what could happen if convergence occurred in the future. We
ﬁnd that sizeable convergence has to occur before our conclusions no longer apply.
Our conclusions are apparent in our simpliﬁed model for the three main countries.
Arguably they would be all the more supported by an analysis that included all 12 economies
in the area – as well as amore sophisticated and detailed description of their actual functioning
–thanis providedby the simpleaggregatedemand-Phillips curvemodels weuse. In particular,
a fully-ﬂedged model for each individual country could pay closer attention to country-
speciﬁc institutional features, labor market arrangements, tax structures, etc., thereby probably
increasing asymmetries amongst country models. In this respect, one could even conjecture
that the reduction in the welfare losses that we measure is a lower bound estimate.
Our results make a clear case for relying on a multi-country modelling approach when
offering advice in support of the single monetary policy, and suggest that a line of research
worth pursuing is a systematic investigation of the aggregation bias that is likely to affect
aggregate (area-wide) estimated relationships and their effects on optimal policies.
According to Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero and Terlizzese (2002), the optimized value
of the loss function could be further reduced if the single monetary policy were to exploit fully
the available national information (by not simply relying on a DEAM, but also reacting to
national information). Combining these results with ours, one can appreciate the full distance
between a“pureaggregateapproach”(using an AEAMmodeland computing an AEAM-based
rule) and a “full multi-country one” (using a DEAM and allowing for the policy instrument30
to react to country-speciﬁc variable): the total reduction in the optimized value of the loss
function is always in the neighborhood of 50 per cent or more.
On the whole, the combined results suggest that, given the structural differences and the
asymmetries in the transmission mechanisms, monetary policy-making in the euro area has a
lot to gain if a disaggregate approach is followed, both in setting up the tools for forecasting
and policy analysis in support of policy decision-making, and in designing the way in which
those tools are used.Appendix 1: The area-wide model
The Area Wide Model (AEAM) is a simple two-equation model estimated using
aggregate data for the three largest economies in the euro area (Germany, France and Italy,
jointly accounting for over 70 per cent of the area GDP). It includes an aggregate supply
equation (also referred to as Phillips curve) and an aggregate demand equation (also referred
to as IS curve). The ﬁrst equation determines inﬂation as a function of lagged inﬂation and
output gap. The sum of the coefﬁcients on lagged inﬂation is constrained to unit, so that we
assume the Phillips curve to be of the accelerationist type. The second equation relates the
output gap to its own lagged values and the real interest rate.
A general-to-speciﬁc modelling approach was followed in searching for a satisfactory
empirical speciﬁcation, starting with as many as 6 lags for all variables on the right-hand-side
of the two equations. The ﬁnal speciﬁcation is the following:
πt+1 = α1πt +( 1 − α1)πt−3 + ηyt + ut+1
yt+1 = θyt + ψ(it−1 − 4 · πt−1)+vt+1
where:
– πt+1 = quarter-on-quarter consumer inﬂation rate;
– yt+1 = output gap;
– it+1 = short-term interest rate;
– it+1−k − 4 · πt+1−k = rt+1 is thus a measure of the ex-post real interest rate.
The model was estimated with SURE, in the light of the possibility that the structural
errors of the two equations might be correlated. The sample period extends from 1978.Q1 to
1998.Q4; 84 quarterly observations were therefore used. The estimation results are presented
in TableA.1.1. The corresponding variance-covariancematrix of estimation residuals is shown
in Table A.1.2.
The source of data is the ESA-95 National Accounts for inﬂation and the output gap,
and the BIS data-bank for the short-term interest rate. Inﬂation is measured by the quarter-on-
quarter rate of change of the(seasonally adjusted) households’ consumption deﬂator. Potential
output was estimated by applying a band-pass ﬁlter (see Baxter and King (1995) for details)32
to the (log) GDP (selecting frequency components of 32 quarters and higher, with a truncation
of 16 quarters).
National variables were aggregated using a ﬁxed-weight procedure, largely similar to
the one followed by the ECB. For inﬂation, 1999 PPP consumer spending shares (as computed
by the ECB) were used; for output gap, the weights are given by 1999 PPP real GDP shares
(again, the source of the shares is the ECB). For interest rates, the weights are the PPP nominal
GDP shares computed by the OECD. Output gap and inﬂa tio ns h a re sa r es h o w ninT a b leA .1 . 3 .
While an ample choice of methods to aggregate national macroeconomic data is
available (see, e.g., the extensive analysis in Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2000)), available
evidence suggests that this is far from a crucial factor in shaping the features of estimated
models.
27 Therefore, we did not deem it worthwhile to assess the sensitivity of our results to
the choice of the aggregation method.
27 This is already apparent in the results of Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2000). For an appraisal of the sen-
sitivity of estimated models (speciﬁcally SVARs) to the various aggregation methods, see Labhard, Weeken and
Westaway (2001). The latter conclude that the impact of the choice of the aggregation method on the empirical
r e s u l t si sn e g l i g i b l e .Appendix 2: The multi-country model
The Multi-Country Model (DEAM) includes, for each of the three major euro area
countries, the same set of equations as the AEAM. The speciﬁcation of both the aggregate
supply and the aggregate demand equation is similar to the one adopted in the AEAM but,
in addition, it allows for across-country linkages. Speciﬁcally, inﬂation in any given country
depends not only on its own lagged values and on the corresponding output gap, but also, at
l e a s ti np r i n c i p l e ,o ni n ﬂation “imported” from the other two countries (imported inﬂation is
given by the sum of inﬂation in the foreign country and the rate of change of the relevant
bilateral exchange rate). Like the AEAM, the sum of the coefﬁcients on lagged and imported
inﬂation is constrained to be 1 (the restriction is accepted by the data). The output gap in any
of the three countries depends on its own lagged values and the corresponding real interest
rate, as in the AEAM; in addition, it may react to the output gap in the other two countries,
reﬂecting the tight trade links in the area.
The DEAM also comprises two identities for euro area inﬂation and output gap (the
weights being those described in Appendix 1).
As the model set-up allows for instantaneous cross-country linkages, 3SLS were used to
estimate its parameters. The sample period extends from 1978.Q1 to 1998.Q4 (thus totalling
84 quarterly observations, as for the AEAM). For most of the sample period, the exchange
rates among Germany, France and Italy, though constrained by the ERM of the EMS, were
not ﬁxed. Accordingly, the measure of “inﬂation imported in country i from country j”
was constructed, as mentioned earlier, as the sum of the inﬂa t i o nr a t ei nc o u n t r yj and the
quarter-to-quarter percentage change in the exchange rate between the two countries (units of
currency of countryi needed for 1 unit of countryj’s currency).In theory, full 3SLS estimation
would require the model to include a set of equations for bilateral exchange rates. Given the
well-known difﬁculty of ﬁnding satisfactory empirical speciﬁcations for the exchange rate,
no attempt was made to augment the model with exchange rate equations. However, lagged
values of all variables included in the model were used as instruments for the exchange rates.
At any rate, in the experiments presented below, the percentage change of the exchange rate
was set identically equal to zero, consistently with the introduction of the single currency as
of January 1, 1999.34
It is worth emphasizing that while the model set-up allows for instantaneous cross-
country linkages, so that a simultaneous system estimation strategy is required, we chose
to assume that the real interest rate affects the output gaps only with a lag. Hence, 3SLS
estimation could be carried out without augmenting the estimation model with interest rate
reaction functions for the three countries.



























































t+1−k= quarter-on-quarter rate of change of the exchange rate between country i
and country j (units of country j’s currency for 1 unit of country i’s currency; in the
experiments below, this variable is identically zero, consistently with the introduction of
the single currency in January 1999);
– y
j
t+1 = output gap in country j;
– i
j
t+1 = short-term interest rate in country j (while in estimation a measure of country-
speciﬁc short-term interest rates where used, in the experiments below it was imposed that
the interest rate be the same for all countries, i.e, i
j
t+1 = it+1 for all j’s);
– i
j




t+1 is thus a measure of the ex-post real interest rate in country j.
The starting speciﬁcation included on the right-hand-side of each estimated equation the
ﬁrst 6 lags of all relevant variables. Joint 3SLS estimation of the three sub-models resulted,
after dropping all insigniﬁcant lags, in a much more parsimonious speciﬁcation. The resulting
speciﬁcation is presented in Table A.2.1 (exchange rates have been omitted in the table, as
they play no role in the version of the DEAM used in this paper). The corresponding variance-
covariance matrix is shown in Table A.2.2.
In keeping with the approach followed in similar literature, the model does not include
any constant terms, i.e., it may be taken to provide a description of the functioning of the
euro area economy in the neighborhood of equilibrium. This amounts to implicitly assuming35
that the same equilibrium values apply to all countries, a condition that does not hold in the
sample period, particularly regarding the (implied) equilibrium real interest rates. It is evident
that, if we were to assume that the equilibrium interest rates of the individual country models
differed from oneanother, then the case for following a disaggregate approach would probably
be much stronger.FOR 1.00 1.16 0.67 2.99 3.48 0.58 1.23 1.05 0.60
DEAM-based 0.86 0.82 0.82 4.86 4.63 0.76 1.47 1.54 1.03
AEAM-based 0.59 0.61 0.84 3.72 3.85 0.92 1.38 1.08 1.16
FOR 0.43 0.50 0.79 2.08 2.40 0.75 1.22 0.57 1.04
DEAM-based 0.35 0.44 0.91 3.73 4.72 1.04 1.45 0.84 1.99
AEAM-based 0.27 0.29 0.90 2.56 2.75 1.37 1.36 0.61 2.45
FOR 1.10 1.90 0.52 2.27 3.94 0.65 1.10 1.21 1.78
DEAM-based 1.10 1.29 0.72 3.90 4.59 0.87 1.25 1.70 2.62
AEAM-based 0.66 0.94 0.74 2.51 3.59 1.39 1.16 1.07 3.38
FOR 0.48 0.68 0.74 1.83 2.59 0.79 1.15 0.60 2.29
DEAM-based 0.42 0.54 0.87 3.21 4.12 1.10 1.32 0.86 3.68
AEAM-based 0.29 0.37 0.86 2.12 2.72 1.75 1.23 0.58 4.91
FOR 1.15 2.41 0.43 2.03 4.25 0.71 1.06 1.40 2.93
DEAM-based 1.24 1.66 0.65 3.55 4.77 0.96 1.19 1.89 4.09
AEAM-based 0.72 1.23 0.67 2.17 3.68 1.73 1.10 1.19 5.56
FOR 0.52 0.83 0.70 1.71 2.75 0.83 1.11 0.63 3.57
DEAM-based 0.48 0.64 0.84 2.97 3.96 1.17 1.26 0.90 5.33



























in the loss 
function:37
Table 3
OUT_OF SAMPLE STABILITY, AEAM, 1997.Q1-2001.Q4




OUT_OF SAMPLE STABILITY, DEAM, 1997.Q1-2001.Q4
Equation F-value Tail probability
Germany AS 0.89 60.12
AD 0.37 99.23
France AS 0.67 84.46
AD 0.76 75.38
Italy AS 0.52 95.12
AD 0.68 83.5938
Table A.1.1
ESTIMATE OF THE AEAM
Equation for:




















In parentheses: standard error of the coefﬁcients.
In brackets: lag with which the variables enter the equations.
Table A.1.2
CORRELATION MATRIX OF STOCHASTIC DISTURBANCES OF THE AEAM
Aggregate supply Aggregate demand
Aggregate supply 1 0.031
Aggregate demand 139
Table A.1.3
INFLATION AND OUTPUT GAP WEIGHTS





ESTIMATE OF THE DEAM
Equations for: Germany Equations for: France Equations for: Italy






















































R2 0.514 0.635 0.902 0.730 0.960 0.752
R
2 0.483 0.622 0.894 0.720 0.958 0.740
σ 0.411 0.799 0.332 0.443 0.259 0.490
DW 2.160 2.059 2.050 1.888 2.024 1.815
In parentheses: standard error of the coefﬁcients.
In brackets: lag with which the variables enter the equations.41
Table A.2.3
CORRELATION MATRIX OF STOCHASTIC DISTURBANCES OF THE DEAM
Aggregate supply Aggregate demand
Germany France Italy Germany France Italy
Germany 1 -0.024 0.035 -0.056 -0.009 0.167
Aggregate supply France 1 0.188 -0.013 -0.128 -0.058
Italy 1 0.182 0.009 0.002
Germany 1 0.387 0.026
Aggregate demand France 1 0.328
Italy 1Figure 1
(a) Response of euro area real interest rate (d) Response of euro area nominal interest rate
(a) Response of euro area inflation rate (b) Response of euro area output gap












































(a) Response of euro area real interest rate (d) Response of euro area nominal interest rate
(a) Response of euro area inflation rate (b) Response of euro area output gap

























































(a) Response of euro area real interest rate (d) Response of euro area nominal interest rate
(a) Response of euro area inflation rate (b) Response of euro area output gap





















































Percentage reduction in the optimised loss function,
DEAM-based rule vs. AEAM-based rule
(as a share of overall reduction attainable with FO rule vs. AEAM-based rule)
DEAM-based rule vs. AEAM-based rule



































(c) µ=2.0 (d) µ=3.0
(a) µ=0.1 (b) µ=1.0

























































(c) Response of euro area nominal interest rate
Impulse responses to a temporary Phillips curve shock (+1 s.d. of stochastic terms)
(a) Response of euro area inflation rate
(b) Response of euro area output gap
















































(c) Response of euro area nominal interest rate
Impulse responses to a temporary aggregate demand shock (+1 s.d. of stochastic terms)
(a) Response of euro area inflation rate
(b) Response of euro area output gap











































(c) Response of euro area nominal interest rate
Impulse responses to a temporary monetary policy shock (+1 s.d. of stochastic terms)
(a) Response of euro area inflation rate
(b) Response of euro area output gap














































Percentage of cases in which the DEAM-based rule outperforms the AEAM-based rule
Percentage of cases in which the DEAM-based rule outperforms the AEAM-based rule
by at least 20 per cent of the oprimised loss function associated with the latter
Random drawings from distribution of estimation residuals, 








































by at least 20 per cent of the oprimised loss function associated with the latter
Random drawings from distribution of estimated DEAM parameters,
DEAM-based rule vs. AEAM-based rule
Percentage of cases in which the DEAM-based rule outperforms the AEAM-based rule






































Test that the average loss associated with the DEAM-based rule 
(tail probability)
Random drawings from distribution of estimated DEAM parameters
Testing the significance of the underperformance of the AEAM-based rule





















Recursive estimates of AEAM coefficients, 1996.Q4 – 2001.Q4
Legenda: co1: coeff. inflation (lag 1) in AS curve; co2: coeff. of output gap (lag 1) in AS curve; co3: coeff. of output gap
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Recursive estimates of DEAM coefficients, 1996.Q4 – 2001.Q4
Legenda: co1: coeff. of German inflation (lag 1) in German AS curve; co2: coeff. of German inflation (lag 4) in German AS curve;
co3: coeff. of German output gap (lag 1) in German AS curve; co4: coeff. of German output gap (lag 1) in German AD curve; co5:
coeff. of real interest rate in German AD curve; co6: coeff. of French inflation (lag 1) in French AS curve; co7: coeff. of French
output gap (average of lags 2-5) in French AS curve; co8: coeff. of French output gap (lag 1) in French AD curve; co9: coeff. of real
interest rate in French AD curve; co10: coeff. of Italian inflation (lag 1) in Italian AS curve; co11: coeff. of Italian output gap (lag 1) in
Italian AS curve; co12: coeff. of Italian output gap (lag 1) in Italian AD curve; co13: coeff. of German output gap in Italian AD curve;
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Percentage reduction in the optimised loss function, DEAM-based rule vs. AEAM-based rule
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